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THE IMPRIMATUR OF RECOGNITION:
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES AND THE
FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS
Abstract" The Bureau of Indian Affairs administers a program to federally acknowledge
unrecognized Indian tribes. The federal acknowledgment process requires that petitioning
tribes meet stringent anthropological, historical, and genealogical criteria. These criteria,
however, do not accurately reflect prior standards of federal recognition, and the Bureau
of Indian Affairs inconsistently interprets them from petition to petition. This Comment
describes the background of federal recognition in the executive branch of the government
and analyzes the program and its criteria through a comparison of BIA-issued final deci-
sions. This Comment further suggests reform of the federal acknowledgment process
through legislative restructuring. In particular, the legislature should amend the criteria
to more accurately reflect contemporary tribal society, adequately acknowledge prior fed-
eral relations with petitioners, and provide for more stringent accountability by the
administering agency.
Federal recognition of Indian tribes is a formal political act that
establishes government-to-government relationships between the tribes
and the United States. Recognition acknowledges both the sovereign
status of the tribes and the responsibilities of the United States toward
the tribes.' Originally, the federal government used treaties, executive
orders and other agreements to recognize tribes.2 The number of
Indian tribes that lack federal recognition, however, is nearly equal in
number to those that are recognized.3 The BIA has determined that
the federal government has not formally recognized approximately
230 extant and functioning tribes.' Many of these tribes are eligible
for, and want, recognition.5
In 1978, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) established an adminis-
trative program for federal acknowledgment of unrecognized Indian
tribes.6 This program, called the federal acknowledgment process, 7
originated out of concern for tribes that are legislatively terminated8
1. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (1989).
2. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 268-73 (1986).
3. Currently, the United States recognizes approximately 300 Indian tribes, exclusive of
Alaska Native villages. 53 Fed. Reg. 52,829 (1988).
4. Federal A4cknowledgment Process: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing 1988] (BIA appendix materials).
5. See infra note 56.
6. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1989) (originally codified at 25 C.F.R. § 54).
7. "Federal acknowledgment process" is an informal designation for the program. See, eg.,
Hearing, 1988, supra note 4.
8. In the 1950s, Congress terminated, or formally severed federal relations, with many tribes.
This policy has since been repudiated, but many tribes have not been restored to federal
recognition. Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 139 (1977).
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and otherwise denied rightful recognition.9 The burdens imposed by
the federal acknowledgment process' rigorous research and documen-
tation requirements, bureaucratic delays, and a legal presumption
against recognition of petitioning tribes, however, have combined to
make the process more burdensome than the problems which the BIA
intended to correct. As a result, the acknowledgment program has led
the BIA to preclude deserving tribes from federal recognition and
impedes the progress of other tribes petitioning under those
regulations.
I. THE HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FEDERAL
RECOGNITION
A. The Evolution of Federal Recognition
The United States government has recognized Indian tribes in vari-
ous ways since its own inception. 10 The earliest executive branch rec-
ognition of tribes occurred in the context of treaty-making and
establishment of executive order reservations."1 In this century the
executive branch, through the Department of the Interior, initially
determined which tribes were eligible for its administrative services.
Early principles of administrative recognition were based on a United
States Supreme Court decision defining a "tribe"' 2 and de facto recog-
nition through the words and deeds of the executive and legislative
branches. 13
In his seminal work on Indian law, Felix Cohen, the first solicitor of
the BIA, elaborated on the principles of executive recognition by
developing the "Cohen criteria."14 The Cohen criteria present a hier-
archy of evidence that the BIA considers when determining tribal sta-
tus. The most important factors encompass relations with the federal
government, including treaty relations, legislation, and denomination
9. TASK FORCE TEN, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT ON TERMINATED AND NONFEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIANS (1976) [hereinafter
AIPRC REPORT].
10. 1 F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 35 (1984). The Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 19, 1
Stat. 329 (1793) (modern codification at 25 U.S.C.A. § 177 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)), forbade
individuals and states from treating with North American Indian tribes, and reserved that power
exclusively to the federal government. Id. at 91.
11. F. PRUCHA, supra note 10, at 54-58.
12. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901). The Court defined a tribe as a "body of
Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under one leadership or
government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory." Id. at 266.
13. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 61 (BIA appendix materials).
14. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 270-72. The Cohen criteria were first used to determine the
eligibility of tribes to organize pursuant to section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
ch. 576, 48 Stat. 987 (current version at 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 (West Supp. 1990)).
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as a tribe by the government or other tribes."5 Existence of a tribal
council or other body of government that has exercised political
authority over a tribe may provide evidence of those relations with the
federal government.1 6
Cohen also denominated sociological considerations, such as ethnol-
ogy, history and social solidarity, as factors entitled to great weight in
determining tribal status. 7 Evidence of continuity, including a cur-
rently functioning community, is integral to the analysis.1" Cohen
cautioned that the differences between a tribe and a voluntary associa-
tion can be difficult to determine, particularly where the United States
government endeavored to destroy the tribal government.19
The Cohen criteria, however, lacked precision in application, and
the BIA, until 1978, had no systematic method of applying the criteria
to determine which tribes were eligible for its services.2" In addition to
the Cohen criteria, the BIA relied on a mixture of court opinions, lim-
ited statutory guidance, treaty law, and evolving departmental policy
and practices to determine tribal status.21 The BIA lacked a clear and
consistent system to apply these factors and officially recognize
tribes. 22
Significant court battles of the 1970s also illustrated the need for a
systematic acknowledgment process. Northeastern tribes, unrecog-
nized by the federal government but long-standing Indian communi-
ties nonetheless, challenged the government's failure to prevent state
infringement on tribal autonomy.23 In Washington state, tribes receiv-
ing BIA services lost those services and entitlements following adjudi-
cation of the United States v. Washington decisions.24 As a result,
15. F. COHEN, supra note 2, at 271-72.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at%61-62 (BIA appendix materials).
21. Id.
22. Id
23. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.) (plaintiff Indians did not
exist as a tribal entity at time of suit, and are therefore ineligible for federal protection of tribes
under Trade and Intercourse Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Joint Tribal Council of
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (lst Cir. 1975) (federally unrecognized tribe is
entitled to protections of the Trade and Intercourse Act, and the federal government must act to
prevent state incursions on tribal lands).
24. The court first found that treaty tribes are entitled to one-half of the harvestable fish taken
from Washington state waters. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974) (Boldt I), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). The
court then found that, because intervener tribes did not maintain an organized tribal structure
since treaty signing, they were not eligible to claim tribal treaty fishing rights. United States v.
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previously unrecognized tribes, as well as derecognized tribes, began
requesting recognition and services from the BIA.25
In the 1970s, the problems of landless and unrecognized tribes
began to weigh on the legislative conscience. In 1975, Congress estab-
lished the American Indian Policy Review Commission (AIPRC) to
investigate and report on the problems plaguing American Indians.26
The AIPRC recognized the inconsistency of the BIA's acknowledg-
ment process as a major flaw in administrative policy, 27 and its find-
ings led to introduction of a bill to formalize policy and procedures for
a federal recognition program.28
Confronted with the AIPRC's report and the increasing number of
requests for recognition from unrecognized tribes, the BIA also real-
ized the need for a systematic recognition process. The agency opted
to establish its own acknowledgment program by regulation,29 rather
than wait for congressional directive.3" The federal acknowledgment
process established a set of procedures Indian groups must follow
when seeking recognition and commensurate benefits from the federal
government.3'
B. Why Recognition?
Federal recognition offers extremely important powers and protec-
tions to Indian tribes. Federally recognized Indian tribes exercise lim-
ited sovereignty over their own territories, which are held in trust by
the United States. 32 Sovereign status confers powers of self-govern-
ment on tribes and gives rise to federal preemption, which prevents
states from infringing on tribal lands and powers.33 Tribal sovereignty
derives, in part, from the treaties negotiated between tribes and the
United States in the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries. 34 Many trea-
ties reserved the land bases over which tribes exercise sovereignty, as
Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101 (W.D. Wash. 1979), aff'd, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Canby, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
25. See Hearing 1988, supra note 4, at 61 (BIA appendix materials).
26. 2 F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 1162-70 (1984).
27. AIPRC REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-7.
28. See Recognition of Certain Indian Tribes: Hearing on S. 2375 Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5-14 (1978) [hereinafter Hearing, 1978].
29. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1989) (originally codified at 25 C.F.R. § 54).
30. Since 1978, Congress has held several oversight hearings and considered proposed
legislation on the federal acknowledgment process. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying
text.
31. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1989).
32. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-62 (1832).
33. McClanahan v. Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
34. F. PRUCHA, supra note 10, at 17, 31.
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well as off-reservation hunting and fishing rights, and rights to services
from the federal government. 35
Federal recognition is also an important requirement for Indian
groups seeking services from the federal government. 36 Federal agen-
cies have typically defined their Indian service population according to
the Indian Self-Determination Act.37 That statute defines Indian tribe
as "any Indian tribe, band, nation or other organized group or commu-
nity, including any Alaska Native village... which is recognized as
eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United
States to Indians because of their status as Indians. '38
The BIA adopted this definition into its regulations, but recently
deleted the phrase "or other organized group or community" from
many of its program regulations and added the requirement of federal
recognition. 39 Because of this change in definition, unrecognized
tribes are increasingly denied BIA services.4 Moreover, the BIA's
definition further impacts unrecognized tribes because other agencies
commonly define eligibility for their services as membership in BIA-
recognized tribes."1 Thus, because federal recognition bestows impor-
tant benefits, the BIA's administration of the federal acknowledgment
process directly affects the livelihood of many Indian tribes.
C. The Unseeables: Unrecognized Tribes
A variety of circumstances, ranging from historic acts and omis-
sions to modem bureaucratic entanglements, have resulted in many
contemporary Indian tribes that remain federally unrecognized. Two
western states, California and Washington, provide numerous exam-
35. It. at 31; see also 4 TxiE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 2267-2526 (1973).
36. Recently, the United States entered into an $11 million direct funding program with six
tribes, bypassing the usual BIA administration of federal grants to tribes. Seattle Times, July 16,
1990, at E-4, col. 1. The United States recognizes all six tribes. See generally 53 Fed. Reg.
52,829 (1988). One of the beneficiary tribes, the Jamestown Klallam, was only recently
recognized under the federal acknowledgment process. 45 Fed. Reg. 81,890 (1980).
37. 25 U.S.C.A. § 450 (West Supp. 1990).
38. Id. § 450b(e) (emphasis added).
39. See, eg., Financial Assistance and Social Services Program, 25 C.F.R. § 20 (1990); Loans
to Indians, 25 C.F.R. § 101 (1990); Housing Improvement Program, 25 C.F.R. § 256 (1990).
40. Some federal services are available to tribes recognized by the state in which they are
located. See, eg., 45 C.F.R. § 96.30 (1989) (defining Department of Health and Human Services
block grant eligibility). States, however, may defer to federal recognition. See, eg., Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 20.002(13) (West Supp. 1989).
41. See, eg., 42 C.F.R. § 36(12) (1989) (imiting Indian Health Service eligibility to members
of federally recognized tribes). The BIA annually publishes a list of all federally recognized
tribes. See, eg., 53 Fed. Reg. 52,829 (1988).
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ples of tribes in need of a process that can quickly and fairly determine
federal recognition.
In California, tribes remain unrecognized because of unratified trea-
ties. The United States negotiated eighteen treaties with California
tribes between 1851 and 1852.42 Based on these agreements, including
federal promises to establish 7.5 million acres in reservation land
bases, tribes ceded their aboriginal lands and began to relocate.43 The
United States Senate, however, refused to ratify the California trea-
ties' and filed them under an injunction of secrecy.45
Since 1851, Congress has made various attempts to restore lands
and autonomy to the California tribes.' In 1958, however, Congress
terminated forty-one of the restored tribes.4 7 Having repudiated its
termination policy, Congress has or will restore twenty-seven termi-
nated tribes to federally recognized status. 48  Nevertheless, an addi-
tional twenty-one California tribes that never received the benefit of
their treaties are petitioning for recognition under the federal acknowl-
edgment process.49
In Washington, nine landless tribes have petitioned for recognition
under the acknowledgment program.° Prior to the 1974 decision in
United States v. Washington adjudicating off-reservation fishing
rights,51 the BIA recognized and provided services to these tribes. The
tribes enjoyed fishing rights reserved and protected by three treaties
between the United States and Western Washington tribes.12 In 1981,
however, the Ninth Circuit denied five of these tribes intervention sta-
42. Heizer, Treaties, in 8 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 701-02 (W.C.
Sturtevant ed. 1978).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 703. California legislators objected to the quantity of land set aside for reservations.
Also, the costs of the annuities and services promised by the treaties greatly exceeded that which
the Senate had anticipated and appropriated. F. PRUCHA, supra note 10, at 387.
45. Heizer, supra note 42, at 703.
46. See, e.g., Four Reservations Act, ch. 48, 13 Stat. 39 (1864) (amended 1865).
47. California Rancheria Act, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (1958). See supra note 8
regarding federal termination policy.
48. Federal Acknowledgment Administrative Procedures Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 611 Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 69 (1989) [hereinafter
Hearing, 1989] (statement of S.V. Quesenberry, Director of Litigation, California Indian Legal
Services).
49. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 75 (BIA appendix materials).
50. None of the petitioning tribes have a reservation, primarily due to historical accident and
broken treaties. See, e.g., R. RUBY & J. BROWN, A GUIDE TO THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST 71, 73, 213, 224 (1986).
51. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (Boldt I), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
52. Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26,
1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132.
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tus in the litigation over Indian fishing rights.53 Because this litigation
restructured fishing rights in Washington, the landless tribes could no
longer legally participate in the Puget Sound fisheries, even on a sub-
sistence basis." In addition, the court's decision prompted the BIA to
cease providing services to these tribes.5 Thus, unrecognized tribes in
Washington currently lack both land and access to treaty fisheries.
As these examples illustrate, all three branches of the federal gov-
ernment have participated in ad hoc derecognition of Indian tribes.
Many of these tribes are now seeking re-recognition, and the federal
acknowledgment process provides the necessary framework for such a
program.
D. Current Administration of the Federal Acknowledgment Process
1. Petitions and Decisions
Since the BIA initiated the acknowledgment process in 1978, 120
Indian groups have petitioned for federal recognition. 6 Final deter-
minations have been made with regard to nineteen of the 120 peti-
tions.5 7 The BIA granted eight petitions,58 denied eleven petitions,5 9
53. United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981) (Canby, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
54. United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101, 1111 (W.D. Wash. 1979), aff'd, 641
F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981) (Canby, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
55. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 12, 88-89 (statement of Russel Barsh on behalf of Cecile
Maxwell, Chairperson, Duwamish Tribe).
56. One hundred fourteen Indian groups had petitioned as of May 5, 1989. Hearing, 1989,
supra note 48, pt. 2, at 47 (statement of Hazel Elbert, Acting Deputy to the Assistant Secretary
for Indian Affairs, BIA, Department of the Interior). Six groups have petitioned since. See
Canoncito Band of Navajos, 55 Fed. Reg. 668 (1990); Revived Ouachita Indians of Arkansas and
America, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,903 (1990); Ohlone/Coastanoan Muwekma Tribe, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,070
(1989); Indian Canyon Band of Coastanoan/Mutsun Indians of California, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,948
(1989); Paucatuck Eastern Pequot Indians of Connecticut, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,474 (1989); Salinan
Nation, 54 Fed. Reg. 50,027 (1989).
57. Final determinations are unpublished. Copies may be obtained by writing to the Office of
Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs, 1951 Constitution Ave. N.W., Mail Stop 32-SIB,
Washington, D.C., 20245.
58. San Juan Southern Paute Tribe of Arizona, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,502 (1989); Wampanoag
Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., 52 Fed. Reg. 4193 (1987); Poarch Band of Creeks of Alabama,
49 Fed. Reg. 24,083 (1984); Narrangansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177
(1983); Death Valley Timbi-Sha Shoshone Band of California, 47 Fed. Reg. 50,109 (1982);
Tunica-Biloxi Indian Tribe of Louisiana, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,411 (1981); Grand Traverse Band of
Ottowa and Chippewa, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,821 (1980); Jamestown Clallam, 45 Fed. Reg. 81,890
(1980).
59. Machis Lower Alabama Creek Indian Tribe, Inc., 53 Fed. Reg. 23,694 (1988); Samish
Indian Tribe, 52 Fed. Reg. 3709 (1987); Tchinouk Indians of Oregon, 51 Fed. Reg. 2437 (1986);
Kaweah Indian Nation, Inc., 50 Fed. Reg. 14,302 (1985); Principal Creek Indian Nation East of
the Mississippi, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,302 (1985); United Lumbee Nation of North Carolina and
America, Inc., 50 Fed. Reg. 18,746 (1985); Southeastern Cherokee Confederacy, Inc., Northwest
Washington Law Review
and issued proposed findings against acknowledgment in response to
three petitions.' Six of these decisions are used as examples for the
analysis that follows.
6 1
2. How the Federal Acknowledgment Process Works
The federal acknowledgment procedures require that a group seek-
ing recognition present a petition to the BIA with evidence that the
tribe meets each of seven criteria. 62 The burden of proof as to each
criterion rests with the petitioner.6 3 Failure to prove any one of the
criteria results in denial of recognition.'
The acknowledgment rules also establish timelines for the BIA to
respond to petitions.65 Once a tribe substantially documents its peti-
tion, the BIA reviews it for obvious deficiencies, gives the petitioner
notice of deficiencies, and provides additional time to respond.66
Although the regulations contemplate a single review for obvious defi-
ciencies, in practice the BIA sends repeated deficiency letters and
requests for information to the petitioning groups. 7
Once a petition is complete, the BIA appoints a team of experts to
determine the tribe's status.68 Typically, the team includes an histo-
rian, an anthropologist, and a genealogist, each of whom issues a
Cherokee Wolf Band, Red Clay Inter-Tribal Indian Band, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,047 (1985); Munsee-
Thames River Delaware Indian Nation, 47 Fed. Reg. 50,109 (1982); Lower Muscogee Creek
Tribe-East of the Mississippi, Inc., 46 Fed. Reg. 51,652 (1981).
60. Miami Nation of Indians of State of Indiana, Inc., 55 Fed. Reg. 29,423 (1990); Mohegan
Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 54 Fed. Reg. 47,136 (1989); Snohomish Tribe of Indians, 48
Fed. Reg. 15,540 (1983).
61. The six decisions include the Jamestown Klallam, Grand Traverse Band of Ottowa and
Chippewa, and Poarch Creek favorable determinations, the Samish and Tchinouk negative
determinations, and the Snohomish proposed negative determination.
62. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a)-.7(g) (1989). The criteria, paraphrased, are as follows: (a) petitioner
must establish a continuous Indian identity from historical times to the present; (b) petitioner
must inhabit a specific area or distinctly Indian community, and its members must be
descendants of an historic tribe; (c) petitioner must have maintained autonomous political
authority over its members throughout history; (d) petitioner must present its governing
document or a statement describing membership criteria and governance procedures; (e)
petitioner must present a membership roll with evidence that all members descended from the
historic tribe; (f) petitioner's membership must not belong to other Indian tribes; and (g)
petitioner's relationship with the federal government must not have been terminated by
Congress.
63. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (1989).
64. 25 C.F.R. § 83.90) (1989).
65. 25 C.F.R. § 83.9(f)-.9(h) (1989).
66. 25 C.F.R. § 83.9(b) (1989).
67. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 203 (statement of Allogan Slagle, Lutheran Office for
Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, and Association for Non-
Federally Recognized Tribes of California).
68. Id. at 63 (BIA appendix materials).
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report evaluating the evidence in light of the published criteria.69 Peti-
tioners provide the bulk of the research, but BIA experts may conduct
additional research when evaluating petitions.7'
Upon completing their analyses, the BIA experts combine or sum-
marize their reports and issue proposed findings with regard to the
petition.71 Following a notice and comment period,72 the Assistant
Secretary of Indian Affairs authorizes and issues the final determina-
tion.73 In theory, the Assistant Secretary could alter the expert team's
decision, but has never done so.74
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE FLAWS OF
THE FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS
A. Inside the Process: Analysis of Administrative Decisions
Many commentators have criticized the federal acknowledgment
process, focusing both on its structure and its application.75 Problems
include financial burdens and time delays placed on petitioning tribes,
administrative flaws, legal inequities, and fallacies in the expert proof
that the process demands. The following sections analyze these
problems using the BIA's decisions on six petitions as illustrations.76
1. The Burden on Petitioning Tribes
Tribes petitioning for recognition under the acknowledgment pro-
cess are faced with the enormous task of documenting their history
and current status. Petitioners must submit minutely detailed reports
69. Id
70. 25 C.F.R. § 83.9(a) (1989).
71. Hearing 1988, supra note 4, at 63 (BIA appendix materials).
72. Interested parties may comment on petitions at any time after they are submitted to the
BIA. 25 C.F.R. § 83.8(d) (1989). Tribes located near the petitioner often comment. The Tulalip
Tribes of Washington submitted comments for both the Snohomish and Samish petitions.
Snohomish Tribe of Indians, Inc., BIA Report, Summary at 7 (1983) [hereinafter Snohomish
Report] (on file with the Washington Law Review); Samish Indian Tribe, BIA Report, at 3 (1987)
[hereinafter Samish Report] (on file with the Washington Law Review).
73. Hearing. 1988, supra note 4, at 62-63 (BIA appendix materials).
74. Quinn, Public Ethnohistory? Or, Writing Tribal Histories at the BIA, THE PUB.
HisToxAu, Spring 1988, at 71. A reversal of a decision, which is quite detailed, would
presumably require similar detail.
75. See eg., Hearing, 1989, supra note 48, pts. 1 and 2; Hearing, 1988, supra note 4; Barsh,
Dialogue on Federal Acknowledgment of Indian Tribes, 10-2 PRACICING ANTHROPOLOGY 2
(1988); Barsh & Hajda, A Reply to Roth, 10-3/4 PRACTICING ANTHROPOLOGY 2 (1988); Roessel,
Federal Recognition-A Historical Twist of Fate, NARF LEGAL REVIEW, Summer 1989, at 1;
Association of American Indian Affairs, Inc., The FederalAcknowledgment Project, 120 INDIAN
AFFAIRs 3 (1989).
76. For a list of decisions, see supra note 61.
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tracing the history and lineage of their tribe to prove each of the seven
BIA criteria." The criteria are written broadly in order to accommo-
date the variety of social and political profiles that petitioners pres-
ent." The BIA, however, interprets these criteria narrowly and
requires extensive documentation to prove each element. 9
For example, tribes often encounter problems establishing the first
criterion's requirement that petitioners have been identified as Ameri-
can Indians on a "substantially continuous basis."' Petitioners must
document their existence from their initial contact with non-Indians"
generation by generation8 2 to the present. In early decisions, the BIA
accepted lengthy intervals between documentation, inferring that the
tribe existed between those intervals.8 3 A later BIA decision, however,
restricted the acceptable time span between intervals to as little as
eight years.8 4
These inconsistencies create uncertainty about the frequency of evi-
dence necessary to prove a substantially continuous Indian identity. 5
Even though the BIA defines the interval as "generational,"8 6 the
agency may require petitioners to document their history at ten-year
intervals or less.8 7 Such a requirement is more stringent than that
necessitated by the generational definition. The BIA's inconsistent
77. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a)-.7(g) (1989).
78. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 64 (BIA appendix materials).
79. See infra notes 83-84.
80. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) (1989).
81. Id. § 83.1(1).
82. Id. § 83.1(m).
83. This presumption is based on language in the regulations. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) states: "A
petitioner shall not fail to satisfy any criteria herein merely because of fluctuations of tribal
activity during various years." The Grand Traverse documentation contained a gap from 1955
to 1971. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, BIA Report, anthropological
sec. at 12, 20 (1979) [hereinafter Grand Traverse Report] (on file with the Washington Law
Review). The decision states that this lack of activity was not an "indication that the community
was lacking in cohesion." Id. at 12. Because there was no evidence that the tribe didn't exist, it
existed. Information provided with the Jamestown Klallam petition was sketchy for the periods
from 1855 to 1874, 1885 to 1911, and 1940 to 1966. Jamestown Band of Clallam Indians of
Washington, BIA Report, anthropological sec. at 7, 10, 14 (1980) (this Comment will henceforth
use the tribe's own spelling of its name) [hereinafter Jamestown Klallam Report] (on file with the
Washington Law Review). The Poarch Creek petition contained a gap from 1850 to 1890.
Poarch Band of Creeks of Alabama, BIA Report, anthropological sec. at 3 (1983) [hereinafter
Poarch Creek Report] (on file with the Washington Law Review).
84. Two gaps in the documentation of Snohomish tribal activity, from 1917 to 1925 and from
1935 to 1950, were sufficient to defeat their eligibility under this criterion. Snohomish Report,
supra note 72, at 8-10.
85. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 40, 198-200 (statement of Allogan Slagle).
86. 25 C.F.R. § 83.1(m) (1989).
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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application of the interval criterion has forced later petitioners to
struggle with evidentiary ambiguity when documenting their history.
The financial burden to petitioners is also considerable. The cost of
preparing petitions is estimated at between $50,000 and $150,000.8
While some funding is available, 9 petitioners usually must rely on
academic volunteers and shoulder the cost of research themselves.
Finally, the time required to process petitions also frustrates peti-
tioning tribes. Research takes years, and the BIA cannot consider a
petition until it is fully documented. 90 Once the BIA accepts a peti-
tion for consideration, the agency will not issue a final determination
for an average of four and one-half years.91 Moreover, this response
time will increase as the petition backlog expands. Such delays result
in out-of-date information about petitioners' contemporary commu-
nity and make funding plans for response to obvious deficiency
requests difficult. 92
2. Legal Inequities,
The BIA derived the acknowledgment criteria from the Cohen cri-
teria,93 court decisions,94 and congressional recommendations. 95 The
agency, however, chooses selectively from these guidelines, and applies
them inconsistently. The result places an inequitable legal burden on
petitioning tribes.
88. Hearing, 1989, supra note 48, pt. 2, at 198 (appendix materials submitted by the
Association for American Indian Affairs, Inc.); Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 7 (statement of
Hazel Elbert); Id. at 193 (appendix materials submitted by Native American Rights Fund). For
example, the United Houma Nation of Louisiana spent $11,000 responding to a second "obvious
deficiency" letter. Id at 271 (statement of Kirby Verret, Chair, United Houma Nation, Inc.,
Louisiana).
89. For example, the Administration for Native Americans' Status Clarification Project
provides some funding for petitioning tribes. Native American Programs Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2991 (West Supp. 1990). Regulations found at 45 C.F.R. § 1336 (1989).
90. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 62-63 (BIA appendix materials).
91. ORBIs ASSOCIATES, FINAL REPORT: EVALUATION OF STATUS CLARIFICATION
PROJECTS FUNDED BY ANA FY 1981 - FY 1988 48 (1989), reprinted in Hearing, 1989, supra
note 48, pt. 2, at 366.
92. Final determinations typically include a report on the contemporary demographics of the
petitioning group because the regulations require evidence of an existing community. 25 C.F.R.
§ 83.7(a)-.7(e) (1989).
93. See F. COHEN, supra note 2.
94. See cases cited supra note 23-24.
95. Hearings, 1978, supra note 28, at 61.
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a. Prior Tenets of Recognition
Four of the acknowledgment criteria require that petitioners pro-
vide extremely detailed historical documentation 96 and overcome a
presumption against tribal status.97 In contrast, the Cohen criteria,9
relevant caselaw, 99 and the legislative recommendations" ° all empha-
size the importance of tribal recognition based on treaties, agreements,
reservation lands, provision of BIA services, or other actions by the
federal government clearly indicating tribal status. The BIA contends
that such evidence only establishes proof of tribal existence at specific
points in time and requires that petitioners supplement the intervals 1
with "substantive" proof of continuous political and social cohe-
sion.' ° Even the BIA's own relations with a tribe are insufficient to
prove de facto recognition.' 03 The acknowledgment criteria should
recognize the primacy of a petitioner's treaty or other relations with
the federal government as evidence of tribal status. Instead, the BIA
discounts such evidence, equating it with more mundane documenta-
tion."° This practice violates prior tenets of recognition that should
serve as the foundation of the acknowledgment criteria.
b. Beyond a Reasonable Burden
The difficulty of proving the criteria is further compounded by a
shifting standard of review. The criteria contain undefined terms and
the threshold of proof is obscure. Most alarming, however, is the
BIA's inconsistent analysis and application of evidence to the criteria.
Vague descriptive terms cloud meaningful understanding of the
standard of review. The BIA has never explicitly defined the meaning
of such terms as "substantially continuous Indian identity,"10 5 "spe-
cific area . . . or community viewed as American Indian and distinct
96. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a)-.7(c), .7(e) (1989).
97. Id. §§ 83.6(d), 83.7.
98. F. COHEN, supra note 2.
99. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (permitting jurisdiction of a federal criminal
statute over tribal member defendant despite lapse of previous federal supervision over tribe);
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (permitting extension of a federal liquor
prohibition to non-reservation Pueblo communities based on the history of relations between
those groups and the executive and legislative branches of the federal government).
100. Hearing, 1978, supra note 28.
101. The length of this interval is uncertain. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
102. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 66-67 (BIA appendix materials).
103. This policy excuses the BIA from responsibility for its unilateral termination of services
to tribes such as those in Washington. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
104. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a)(1)-.7(a)(7) (1989); Hearing, 1989, supra note 48, pt. 2, at 43-44
(statement of Lynn Forcia, Chief, Branch of Acknowledgment and Research, BIA).
105. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) (1989).
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from other populations," °106 or "tribal political influence or other
authority.""1 7 The BIA provides examples of evidence that are
acceptable as proof of these terms," 8 but tribes can only interpret
those examples based on the agency's' final deterniinations. Unfortu-
nately, the final determinations do not provide consistent examples
and are replete with vague terms. 1 9 Quantified analysis of the evi-
dence is rare.110
Treatment of the second criterion111 in final decisions provides an
example of the problem with ambiguous terms. The percentage of a
petitioning tribe that must inhabit a specific area or live in a distinct
community in order to constitute a "substantial portion" of that tribe
is unclear. The BIA is precise in its analysis of the proximity of mem-
bers to the community in its decisions granting recognition. 11 2 In its
decisions denying recognition, however, the BIA defines the location
of petitioners' membership with less precision.113 Ill-defined terms
and inconsistent application frustrate the petitioners' efforts to under-
stand and provide the information necessary to meet the acknowledg-
ment criteria.
An indeterminate quantum of proof compounds the problem of
vague terms. The BIA, citing a need for flexibility, refuses to provide
material guidance on the cumulative amounts of evidence needed to
meet the criteria. 4 As a result, tribes must document their petitions
without knowing the necessary requirements. For instance, the inter-
vals at which evidence must be provided to prove a "substantially con-
106. Id. § 83.7(b).
107. Id. § 83.7(c).
108. BIA, Regulations, Guidelines and Policies for Federal Acknowledgment as an American
Indian Tribe (available from the BIA at address supra note 57) (on file with the Washington Law
Review).
109. For example, the term "presumably probably" appears in Grand Traverse Report, supra
note 83, anthropological sec. at 5.
110. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 37 (statement of Faith Roessel, staff attorney, Native
American Rights Fund).
111. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b) (1989).
112. Among the Grand Traverse, 46% of the tribe lives 150 miles or more from the core
community. Grand Traverse Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 23. Among the
Jamestown Klallam, 41% live more than thirty-five miles away, including 15% that live out of
state. Jamestown Klallam Report, supra note 83, genealogical see. at 5.
113. Among the Tchinouk, 51% live elsewhere in Oregon and nine other states. Tchinouk
Indians of Oregon, BIA Report, at 43 (1985) [hereinafter Tchinouk Report] (on file with the
Washington Law Review). The Snohomish decision fails to analyze the location of tribal
members. Instead, it states that the tribe is "widely scattered" or "widely dispersed," even
though "some members" live in close proximity to each other. Snohomish Report, supra note
72, at 12, 14.
114. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 64-65 (BIA appendix materials).
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tinuous Indian identity" is unclear. 1 5 Similarly, petitioners are
unsure how closely members must live to each other to be a distinct
Indian community. While flexibility is essential to permit recognition
of a wide variety of tribal profiles, the BIA should provide explicit
guidelines and explanations of the quantum of evidence needed to
meet the evidentiary burdens."16
Ultimately, undefined terms and evidentiary burdens create the
major problem with the standard of review-the inconsistency with
which it is applied to differing petitions. The BIA claims that each
petition is evaluated without reference to any other petition or recog-
nized tribe.' 7 This assertion is clearly untrue. For example, the
BIA's Snohomish decision is slanted toward comparison of the Sno-
homish with the Tulalip Tribes of Washington." 8 Likewise, the BIA's
Samish decision compares the Samish with the Swinomish and Lummi
Tribes of Washington." 9
Furthermore, inconsistent application of standards are evident
throughout the final determinations.' 2 ° The most troubling of these
inconsistencies is the BIA's treatment of petitioners' prior claims
activity' as evidence of continuity and political autonomy.' 22 If the
BIA conferred recognition on a petitioner, the agency relied on the
tribe's prior claims activity as acceptable evidence to meet the various
criteria, even when the tribe's specific political authority was
unclear.' 23 When the BIA has denied petitions, however, the agency
115. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) (1989).
116. The quality of documentary evidence can be an issue as well. The BIA questioned the
United Houma Nation's petition on the basis of a newspaper article, despite considerable
academic evidence supporting the petition. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 277 (statement of
Jack Campisi, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Wellesley College). The Snohomish petition
cited a humorous anecdotal work, B. MCDONALD, THE EGG AND I (1945), to document the
tribe's movement. Snohomish Report, supra note 72, at 11.
117. Hearing, 1989, supra note 48, pt. 2, at 47 (statement of H. Elbert).
118. Snohomish Report, supra note 72, at 8, 10, 15, 16, 17.
119. Samish Report, supra note 72, at 5, 9, 19.
120. The decisions contain several inconsistencies in addition to those set forth in the text
below. For example, members of all petitioning tribes are of mixed racial heritage, often because
of marriages between non-Indian settlers and Indian women. This background is approved in
the Poarch Creek decision and disapproved in the Snohomish and Tchinouk decisions. Poarch
Creek Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 16-18, 20; Snohomish Report, supra note
72, at 10; and Tchinouk Report, supra note 113, at 47. It is ignored in the Jamestown Klallam
decision.
121. Prior claims activity has included, for example, settlement and distribution of proceeds
from land cession agreements, reparations for broken treaty promises, and applications for tribal
organization under the IRA. See, e.g., R. RUBY & J. BROWN, supra note 50, at 180, 213, 224.
122. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(c) (1989).
123. The Grand Traverse political leadership and processes were based on claims activity,
and the final determination admitted little understanding of the historic power and selection of
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rejected claims activity as evidence of tribal existence124 and has even
used this evidence against the petitioner.1 25
In sum, the acknowledgment criteria employ vague terms and spec-
ify neither the quantity nor the quality of evidence required to prove
those terms. Close examination of the BIA decisions reveal the
agency's inconsistent treatment of similar evidence in different peti-
tions. The various problems have established a cryptic standard of
review that the BIA uses arbitrarily to make determinations concern-
ing tribal recognition.
3. The Fallacy of Expert Proof
The requirements of the acknowledgment criteria governing peti-
tions encompass three academic areas: anthropology, history, and gen-
ealogy. Teams of specialists in these three fields review petitions and
write reports that are the foundation of the BIA's final determina-
tions.' 26 Other experts, however, have questioned the use of these dis-
ciplines to prove or disprove tribal existence.' 27
a What is a Tribe?
The term "tribal existence" raises the first question. The goal of the
acknowledgment program is to determine tribal existence, but anthro-
pologists note that for many historic Indian groups "tribe" is a misno-
mer, a European concept complete with inapplicable notions of how
tribal society operates.' 28  Thus, the BIA forces some petitioning
leaders. Grand Traverse Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 5, 9, 21. The historic
Poarch Creek leadership and authority was admittedly unclear and described as "informal." The
local component of a regional Indian claims organization only commenced governance of the
Poarch Creek community in the 1970s. Poarch Creek Report, supra note 83, historical sec. at 3,
43-45.
124. The Snohomish decision disregards and rejects that tribe's claims organization and
activities as proof of political autonomy. Snohomish Report, supra note 72, at 8-10; see also
Tchinouk Report, supra note 113, at 33-37, 39-43.
125. The Samish decision traces the tribe's history through claims activity from the time of
contact to the present, and then cited this evidence as proof that no political authority operated
over the tribe. Samish Report, supra note 72, at 19, 21.
126. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 68 (BIA appendix materials).
127. Hearing, 1989, supra note 48, pt. 2, at 168, 176, 183 (statements of Jack Campisi;
Raymond Fogelson, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago; William Sturtevant,
Anthropologist, Smithsonian Institution); Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 98, 178, 274,
(statements of Dr. Wayne Suttles; Jack Campisi; Adolph Dial, Chair, American Indian Studies
Department, Pembroke State University); Barsh, supra note 75, at 2.
128. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 42-52 (statements of Raymond Fogelson, Department of
Anthropology, University of Chicago, Joseph G. Jorgensen, Professor of Social Science and
Comparative Culture, University of California at Irvine).
223
Washington Law Review
groups to prove the "government's false assumptions."'' 29 Moreover,
despite the BIA's assertion that its criteria are flexible, i3 0 an implied
"ideal" tribe emerges from the agency's decisions. This tribe is an iso-
lated community with private landholdings, which provide easily rec-
ognizable and consistent documentary evidence of the group's
continued existence.' The ideal tribe also practices endogamy, or
intermarriage within the group, which operates to keep the tribe
"pure." 13 2
First, all successful petitioners have landholdings, owned privately
or held in trust by state or county governments.133 Although the
Grand Traverse, Jamestown Klallam, and Poarch Creek core commu-
nities are thoroughly integrated by non-Indians, they are isolated and
therefore easily distinguished as distinct Indian communities. 34 The
Snohomish and Samish, on the other hand, are not concentrated on a
land base, and therefore are not considered geographically distinguish-
able."' Comparable percentages of the tribes live in "specific areas"
that should satisfy the criteria. Those areas, however, have become
predominantly non-Indian over time.' 36 The BIA appears to take the
position that an Indian community cannot persist in an urban or
quasi-urban environment.
Endogamy is the second implied requirement of a successful peti-
tion for recognition. The Grand Traverse and Poarch Creek decisions
cite a high degree of intermarriage among each of those groups.
137
The Jamestown Klallam no longer intermarry, but this practice is
129. Id. at 101 (statement of Dr. Wayne Suttles). Pacific Northwest tribes, for example, were
small interdependent clans lacking centralized authority. Id.
130. Id. at 64 (BIA appendix materials).
131. See, e.g., Poarch Creek Report, supra note 83, historical sec., passim; Jamestown
Klallam Report, supra note 83, historical sec., passim.
132. See, e.g., Poarch Creek Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 18-20; Grand
Traverse Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 17-18. None of the successful petitioners
have maintained more than a small semblance of traditional social or cultural institutions.
Grand Traverse Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 19, Jamestown Klallam Report,
supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 18, Poarch Creek Report, supra note 83, anthropological
sec. at 20.
133. Grand Traverse Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 25-30; Jamestown
Klallam Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 20; Poarch Creek Report, supra note 83,
historical sec., map attachment.
134. Grand Traverse Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 21; Jamestown Klallam
Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 17; Poarch Creek Report, supra note 83,
anthropological sec. at 27.
135. Snohomish Report, supra note 72, at 10; Tchinouk Report, supra note 113, at 44, 65-66;
Samish Report, supra note 72, at 9.
136. R. RUBY & J. BROWN, supra note 50, at 178, 212.
137. Grand Traverse Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 17-18; Poarch Creek
Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 18-20. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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described as a "relatively late phenomenon."' 38 The Pacific North-
west tribes practiced exogamy, the practice of marriage outside the
tribe to members of other clans, bands and tribes.'3 9 The BIA recog-
nizes and accepts this practice in the Jamestown Klallam decision."
The Snohomish and Samish decisions, however, cite exogamous prac-
tices as evidence of lack of social cohesion.14' Thus, the BIA's implied
requirement of tribal endogamy refutes its assertion that vague criteria
permit flexibility in evaluating tribal practices, and instead establishes
a standard many petitioners are unable to meet.
b. The Historical Norm
The acknowledgment criteria require extensive historical documen-
tation. Such documents, however, do not always accurately or com-
pletely reflect the history of Indian tribes. Because North American
Indians did not have writing systems, all early documentation pro-
ceeds from the writing and perspective of non-Indian observers.' 42
Whether and to what extent Indian culture and practices were the sub-
ject of historical recordkeeping is often a valid concern.' 43 Because
the regulations require independent evidence of the community's con-
tinuity and political autonomy, the burden of proof can be overwhelm-
ing, if not impossible to meet.'"
c. The Aboriginal Family Tree
Use of genealogy to prove tribal ancestry presents its own unique
problems. Anthropologists typically use genealogy to learn about kin-
ship and social structures. The BIA, however, uses genealogy in its
popular, non-scientific sense, to trace individual ancestry.145
The BIA's approach to genealogy creates problems because many
North American Indian societies reckoned kinship bilaterally, through
both parents, and practiced exogamy and adoption. 146 Because of
such practices, genealogic ancestor tracing is difficult and does not
138. Jamestown Klallam Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 23.
139. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 99-100 (statement of Dr. Wayne Suttles).
140. Jamestown Klallam Report, supra note 83, anthropological sec. at 3, 23. The decision
does not explain the apparent inconsistency between past endogamy and traditional exogamy.
141. Snohomish Report, supra note 72, at 26; Samish Report, supra note 72, at 23.
142. See, eg., W. HoDGE, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONTEMPORARY NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS (1976).
143. Hearing, 1988, supra note 4, at 227 (statement of Raymond Fogelson).
144. Id. at 276 (statement of Jack Campisi).
145. Id. at 225 (statement of Raymond Fogelson).
146. Id. at 225, 241-48 (statements of Raymond Fogelson and Joseph Jorgensen).
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account for non-blood relations.147 Although some petitioners can
trace their ancestry back to settlement rolls prepared in the late 1800s
and early 1900s, other tribes do not have the benefit of BIA-approved
lists prepared within the last three or four generations.
B. Proposals for Reform
While the current acknowledgment program contains serious flaws,
the process it embodies is important and must be reformed for the
benefit of petitioning tribes. Since 1978, the United States Senate has
held a number of oversight hearings directed at the federal acknowl-
edgment process and its problems.148 In 1989, two bills were intro-
duced to legislate a new structure for the program.14 9 Despite
considerable concern about the existing program expressed at these
proceedings, Congress has failed to act. While Congress has the
authority to provide solutions to the problems of the acknowledgment
program, interminable oversight hearings resulting in studies, reports,
and proposed legislation are insufficient. Congress needs to imprint
the recognition program with a fundamental concern for tribal sover-
eignty, prior governmental relations, and administrative accountabil-
ity. 150 Further, currently recognized tribes must acknowledge the
importance of the federal recognition program for all Indians and
actively participate in its reform. 51
First, a new program needs to assume objectivity. To this end, a
new office, independent of the BIA, is necessary. That office must be
adequately staffed and funded to process petitions within a reasonable
time and incorporate an appellate procedure for aggrieved petitioners.
Petitioners denied acknowledgment under the current regulations
should have access to the new appellate process.
147. Id.
148. Hearing, 1989, supra note 48, pts. I and 2; Hearing, 1988, supra note 4; Oversight of the
Federal Acknowledgment Process: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Federal Acknowledgment Process: Hearing Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes:
Hearing on H.R. 12996 and H.R. 13773 Before the House Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public
Lands, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
149. S. 611, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S2846 (1989); S. 912, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 54733 (1989).
150. Sen. Daniel Inouye proposed many of these reforms in Senate Bill S. 611. That bill never
emerged from committee, criticized in large part for the default deadlines it imposed on the
process. Hearing, 1989, supra note 48, pts. 1 and 2.
151. Russel Barsh predicts a new era in federal Indian policy, termed "redetermination," in
which the BIA will use the federal acknowledgment criteria to limit services to existing tribes.
Barsh, The Rocky Road to "Recognition," 4 ANN. W. REGIONAL INDIAN L. SYMP. 407 (1990).
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Second, Congress should legislate the criteria for recognition, leav-
ing explanatory guidelines for administrative creation. The criteria
should establish a prima facie case of acknowledgment where peti-
tioner can demonstrate ancestry from a tribe with a history of treaty
or other substantial relations with the federal government. Where no
such relations are evident, the petitioners would bear the burden of
proving their tribal background. New regulations should ease the doc-
umentary burden on petitioners, however, by defining the terms of rec-
ognition and relaxing the intervals of documentation. At the same
time, the criteria should explicitly acknowledge that Indian communi-
ties display many social and political profiles and that petitions must
be decided in the context of similar contemporary Indian
communities.
Third, the new acknowledgment office should issue detailed guide-
lines precisely defining the thresholds of proof and addressing the
quantity and quality of evidence necessary to meet those thresholds.
The agency should adhere to its own precedent.
Finally, Congress should provide funding to tribes unable to shoul-
der the costs of petitioning for acknowledgment and should direct the
BIA to provide research support to petitioning tribes by assisting with
access to the department's archives.
The costs of these proposals are not small. The costs of the current
program, however, economically and psychologically, are much
greater. An independent office provided with competent legislative
direction can more efficiently and fairly determine recognition for the
many tribes now awaiting that status.
III. CONCLUSION
Final determinations emerge out of an accumulation of small dis-
tinctions. It is the nature of the analysis-small inconsistencies with.
large cumulative impact-that has insulated the BIA from critical
review of its decisionmaking processes.
The problems of the federal acknowledgment process range from
the administrative to the substantive. Procedural delays create an
unfair process. The criteria fail to reflect prior standards of recogni-
tion that should anchor the decisionmaking criteria. The BIA is using
evidence inconsistently and employing vague, unquantified standards
to arrive at unreviewable conclusions. The agency models comparison
on a rigid definition of tribal society that cannot reflect the social real-
ity of the many diverse North American tribes.
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Although the goals of the acknowledgment program are laudable,
its practical application has evolved into an arbitrary process that frus-
trates the efforts of legitimate tribes seeking federal recognition. Legis-
lative reform is necessary to correct the problems of the federal
acknowledgment process. Congress must actively redirect the pro-
gram to meet its original goals of justice and opportunity for deserving
tribes.
Rachael Paschal
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